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Electricity in Central America: paradigms, reforms and the energy trilemma 
Abstract 
A new global energy era is emerging, one driven by the confluence of energy security, climate 
politics and energy equity issues.  This ‘energy trilemma’ is shaping the global political economy of 
energy, which in turn influences how decisions are made about how energy is provided – referred to 
as global energy governance.  This paper analyses historical and contemporary developments in 
Central America’s power sectors.  This is a region that has long been an implementation space for 
global policy priorities, but has been overlooked by those engaging with the challenges of the energy 
trilemma.  During the 1990s and 2000s, the statist model of energy governance gave way to a 
market-led model in the Central American isthmus.  This led to the privatisation of state-owned 
utilities and the promotion of a regional electricity market.  During this period, the dominance of 
largely hydro-based renewable electricity generation diminished to be replaced by imported fossil-
based generation.  Oil price increases during the early 2000s highlighted the region’s dependence on 
imports, with some countries turning to energy rationing.  Increasingly interventionist state policies, 
which now seek to reduce oil dependence, improve energy efficiency and expand access to 
electricity, are being pursued in the region.  This interventionist turn reflects the pressures of the 
energy trilemma, although energy security, particularly the need to reduce dependence on imported 
oil, remains the most important driver. 
Keywords: Central America; energy paradigms; energy trilemma; electricity. 
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1. Introduction 
Over recent years a new energy era has been emerging, one which sees the confluence of three 
global policy drivers: energy security, climate politics and energy poverty – referred to as the energy 
trilemma (Gunningham, 2013).  These drivers define the current global political economy of energy, 
which is characterised by increasing complexity, path dependency and embeddedness in 
international policy fields (Goldthau and Sovacool, 2012).  While energy policy agendas have 
typically been dominated by concerns for energy security, this agenda has been complemented by 
recognition of the central role of energy in climate change mitigation.  Recent years have also 
witnessed the re-interpretation of long standing social concerns, such as poverty alleviation, in ways 
that place energy at their core.  UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon described sustainable energy as 
‘the golden thread that weaves together economy, environment and equity’ (UN, 2012). 2015 was 
an important agenda-setting year – with the global community converging on two agreements likely 
to determine the policy frameworks for sustainable energy for the coming decades: the 2030 
Agenda for Sustainable Development and the Paris Agreement on climate change.  
 
Goldthau (2012) uses the concept of ‘energy paradigms’ to analyse shifts in national and 
international energy policies and governance over time.  He argues that energy paradigms have 
shifted to reflect wider economic paradigm change, thus the shift from statism to neo-liberalism 
over recent decades.  Most recently, we see a shift to a hybrid state-market model, which 
Goldthau labels ‘interventionist’.  This interventionist paradigm has emerged in response to the 
energy trilemma, which requires those governing energy to deliver on a much more complex set of 
issues than previously.  The interventionist paradigm is one in which energy is viewed as having 
strategic qualities in several critical policy fields, and has arisen in response to the recognition that 
the market alone cannot deliver more normative energy goals.  Many scholars argue that current 
modes of energy governance are unable to match the nature and scope of the challenges 
presented by the energy trilemma (e.g. Florini and Sovacool, 2009; Cherp et al., 2011; Goldthau 
and Sovacool, 2012).  Indeed, Bradshaw (2010, p.275) reminds us of the gravity of these 
challenges, which demand ‘a low carbon energy revolution on a scale beyond the first industrial 
revolution in a much shorter time frame’.  Further, Cherp et al. (2011) argue that such a 
transformation will need to mobilise unprecedented resources, overcome systemic inertia, and 
ensure temporal and scalar coordination across energy sectors, including with non-energy sectors.  
These challenges will require new governance arrangements that enable coordination between 
national governments, private sector actors, civil society and multilateral organisations.   
For Goldthau, ‘paradigms are inextricably linked to rule-setting power’ (2012, p.204).  In other 
words, it is the rule-makers (i.e. industrialised OECD countries and, increasingly, emerging economic 
powers such as China and India) who determine the field for the rule-takers (i.e. developing, non-
OECD countries).  According to this framework, the ability of rule-takers to forge their own energy 
pathways is conditioned by their relative power in the global political economy.  However, the key 
transmitters and enforcers of these ‘rules’ are not elaborated within the framework.  There have 
been several papers that explore the energy trilemma from the perspective of so called rule-makers, 
including Goldthau’s 2012 paper that provides the framework for this analysis (see also Dubash, 
2011; Kong, 2011; La Viña et al., 2011).  However, there have been far fewer publications that focus 
on the consequences of energy paradigm shifts for rule-takers.  Therefore in this paper, we focus on 
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one ‘rule-taking’ region, Central America, to trace the drivers and outcomes of historical and 
contemporary shifts in global energy governance, and to investigate whether there is evidence for a 
shift to an interventionist paradigm.   
There are relatively few publications on recent transitions and energy challenges in Central 
America, particularly considered within their wider social and political-economic contexts.  Several 
academics have investigated the impacts of electricity privatisation in individual states (see, for 
example, Julie Cupples (2011) on Nicaragua, and Wilfredo Flores (2012) on Honduras).  However, at 
the regional level, while the UN Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean 
(CEPAL) provides comprehensive and up-to-date energy statistics, previous research has focused 
on techno-economic analyses (e.g. Hosier et al., 1992; Apergis and Payne, 2009a, 2009b, 2011; 
Meza, 2014), and/ or the implications of reforms, albeit from the perspective of the international 
financial institutions (IFIs) (e.g. Tomiak and Millán, 2002; Millán, 2007; Lecaros et al., 2010; Cayo, 
2011; Reinstein et al., 2011).  The transnationalisation of the energy sector has had far reaching 
consequences for the political economies of the Central American states, yet these impacts have 
been under-researched. The lack of research is perhaps surprising given that as global debates 
focus on decarbonising energy sectors, until fairly recently Central America was undergoing a 
paradoxical transition away from renewable electricity generation to increased dependency on 
fossil generation which has only recently begun to be reversed.  This transition is also paradoxical 
since not only are the countries of Central America highly vulnerable to climate change (Harmeling 
and Eckstein, 2012), but they are also among the most favourable locations in Latin America for 
investment in renewable energy (IDB, 2015).  We argue that Central America provides an 
important case study through which to examine shifting energy paradigms. 
This paper analyses the Central American electricity sectors through the lens of global energy 
paradigms.  It draws on the academic and grey literature, and is further informed by interviews 
conducted with a range of stakeholders, which traced the evolution of Central American energy 
sectors.  The paper begins with an introduction to the political economy of the region and outlines 
the key energy challenges faced by the region.  It then examines the outcomes of shifting energy 
paradigms for the electricity sectors, before moving on to discuss the apparent energy transitions 
underway across the region.   
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2. Central America and its energy challenges 
Located on a narrow strip of land between North and South America, Central America (Figure 1) is 
a relatively small region with a total land area of 49 million hectares.  The six states1 have many 
commonalities, sharing a language, cultures and histories.  The region is also characterised by 
inequality and poverty.  Even in Costa Rica, which has the region’s highest GDP per capita, around 
20% of the population live below the poverty line (CEPAL 2011).   
Figure 1. Map of Central America 
 
Source: freeworldmaps.net 
Demographic changes, including population growth, increasing urbanisation, and better economic 
conditions have contributed to increased demand for electricity.  Since 1990 regional maximum 
electricity demand has more than doubled, reaching 7,825 MW in 2014 (CEPAL, 2015).  Over the 
same period, installed capacity more than trebled (see Table 1).  Electricity coverage has also 
increased significantly since 1990, rising from 57% of the population to 90% by 2013; although, as 
shown in Table 1, electrification rates vary significantly between and within countries.  For example, 
some urban areas in Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua have coverage rates of up to 90%, while 
more isolated rural areas may have as little as 20% electricity access (CEPAL, 2008).  Although 
                                                          
1 The six countries of Central America are Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, and 
Panama.  Although Belize is located in the Central American isthmus, as an English-speaking former British 
colony, it has a distinct history from the other countries in the region.  In this paper we consider it to be 
separate.   
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electrification has increased, electrification levels alone hide significant distributional inequities 
relating to ability to pay as well as quality and sustainability of supply.  The region’s real energy 
matrix remains dominated by the use of traditional biomass. 
Table 1. Evolution of the Central American electricity sectors, demand and electricity coverage 1990 to 2014. 
Country 
Maximum demand (MW) 
Installed capacity 
(MW) 
Net generation 
(GWh) 
Electricity coverage 
(%) 
1990 2014 1990 2014 1990 2014 1990 2013 
CR 682 1632 887 2885 3543 10118 91 100 
ES 412 1035 650 1584 2164 5877 77* 94 
GU 452 1636 811 3134 2318 9781 36 90 
HO 351 1383 533 1940 2274 7789 39 89 
NI 253 636 363 1312 1251 4000 45 91 
PA 464 1504 883 2813 2709 9190 73 76 
C. America 2614 7825 4127 13667 14259 46755 57 90 
CR = Costa Rica; ES = El Salvador; GU = Guatemala; HO = Honduras; NI = Nicaragua; PA = Panamá.  Note: Net 
generation in three countries (GU, NI and PA) appear to be greater than installed capacity.  This may be due to 
reporting errors or unreported off-grid generation capacity.  *Data for 1995.  Sources: CEPAL (2009, 2011, 
2015); IEA World Energy Outlook (2015) 
Whilst there are differences between the electricity sectors of the six Central American states, they 
also face similar challenges.  Firstly, the region’s electricity markets are relatively small.  In 2010, the 
region generated approximately 40 TWh of electricity, which is equivalent to around 70% of the 
annual electricity supply of a medium-sized Latin American country, such as Chile or Colombia 
(Lecaros et al., 2010).  Small markets do not provide a sufficiently large demand base to support 
competition in generation.  This carries the risk of the sector being dominated by one or two players, 
therefore inhibiting competition.  Secondly, several countries in the region have faced challenges in 
balancing supply and demand, at times leading to supply deficits and rationing (Posas, 1995; World 
Bank, 2006; Cupples, 2011).  This has been most acute in Honduras and Nicaragua, which have 
historically been prone to power shortages and rationing.  Continued economic growth means that 
regional energy demand continues to rise and there is an urgent need for the six countries to 
continue to expand their electricity generation capacity.  Thirdly, increased private sector 
participation in electricity generation has led to an increasing reliance on imported fossil fuels.  As a 
result, the region is highly vulnerable to volatility in global oil markets and when the price of oil is 
high, the region’s economies suffer.  Fourthly, popular protests against the development of so-called 
megaprojects, particularly hydroelectric power and biofuels, are common.  Historically, such projects 
have been developed without local consultation, and have particularly affected indigenous groups 
(e.g. in Panama, Guatemala and Honduras); authorities have often responded to resultant protests 
with violent repression.  Finally, despite increased electricity access, of the 43 million people in 
Central America, an estimated seven million still do not have access, while around 20 million rely on 
firewood to satisfy their most basic energy needs (CEPAL, 2008; Dolezal et al., 2013).  National 
governments have typically viewed the alleviation of energy poverty as synonymous with the 
expansion of electricity grids.  However, the reliance on traditional biomass, and the remote location 
of many communities, means that meeting the energy needs of the region’s population is unlikely to 
be satisfied through grid expansion alone. 
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Despite these considerable challenges, there are a number of opportunities – not least the region’s 
impressive renewable energy resource potential, particularly due to abundant hydroelectricity, 
geothermal and solar resources (see Table 2).  Although renewable energy accounts for 60% of the 
electricity generated in the region (CEPAL, 2015), since the 1990s the share of renewables has fallen, 
reflecting the decline of investment in hydroelectricity; more recently, this is beginning to be offset 
by increases in other renewable energy investments.  Dolezal et al. (2013) argue that, given the 
development and implementation of appropriate policies, Central America has the potential to meet 
all of its electricity demand from renewables.  Yet, the Central American states have not always been 
able to exploit these resources.  Another opportunity for the region is the creation of a common 
electricity market, which would mitigate the challenge of each country’s small market size.  Since the 
late 1990s, various treaties have been signed to integrate the six countries’ electricity markets, and 
in June 2013 the interconnected electricity grid, SIEPAC (Sistema de Interconexión de Eléctrica de los 
Países de América Central), became a reality.   
Table 2. Estimated renewable energy potential, installed capacity and percentage renewable energy exploited 
in Central America, 2011. 
Country 
Hydro Geothermal 
Max potential 
(MW) 
Installed 
capacity (MW) 
% exploited 
Max potential 
(MW) 
Installed 
capacity (MW) 
% exploited 
CR 5,802 1834 31.6 235 218 92.8 
ES 2,165 488 22.5 333 204 61.3 
GU 5,000 1033 20.7 1,000 49 4.9 
HO 5,000 624 12.5 120 0 0 
NI 1,760 120 6.8 1,200 155 12.9 
PA 2,341 1623 69.2 40 0 0 
C. America 22,068 5722 25.9 2928 626 21.4 
CR = Costa Rica; ES = El Salvador; GU = Guatemala; HO = Honduras; NI = Nicaragua; PA = Panamá.  Source: 
adapted from data in CEPAL (2009, 2012, 2015) 
Recent events in Central American electricity sectors suggest that state actors, in partnership with 
IFIs and the private sector, are seeking to address Central America’s energy challenges.  In order to 
understand the motivations behind this apparent interventionist turn, this paper first turns to an 
examination of the historical political economy of the region’s electricity sectors. 
3. Shifting energy governance: from state to market 
Until the 1960s, the generation and distribution of electricity in Central America was dominated by 
the private sector, with only minimal government participation.  Access to electricity was restricted, 
reaching between just 12-20% of the population, and largely limited to urban areas (World Bank, 
2001; Batlle et al., 2010).  From the 1960s to the 1990s, much of Central America experienced social 
and political upheaval as revolutions met with counter-insurgencies.  State involvement in the 
energy sector increased during the 1960s and 70s, with efforts focused on expanding electricity 
coverage, mostly focused on urban areas.  Following the oil crises of the 1970s, Central American 
states sought to reduce dependence on oil for electricity generation.  The share of oil declined from 
50% in 1970 to 27% by 1985 (Solá Monserrat, 1989), and was mainly substituted by hydroelectric 
power often with negative impacts on local people and environments (see Johnston, 2005). 
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Following increased state involvement in the region’s electricity sectors during the 1970s and 1980s, 
by the late 1980s electricity utilities were in need of investment.  Armed conflict, high supply losses, 
rising demand for electricity, inadequate tariff policies, and the need to keep pace with economic 
growth resulted in the decision to privatise electricity utilities.  Shifting ownership and operation was 
expected to result in greater efficiency, lower costs and improved access (Barnes and Waddle, 2004; 
Rufatt, 2005).  Throughout the 1990s, neoliberal reforms led to structural changes in most of the 
Central American power sectors.  These included the privatisation of state-owned generation plants, 
transmission and distribution companies, and the establishment of regulatory bodies responsible for 
overseeing electricity utilities.   
Also during this period the IFIs, particularly the World Bank and the Inter-American Development 
Bank (IDB), began to rethink their support strategies in the region.  The IDB in particular was 
instrumental in reforming Central American power sectors.  Two parallel processes lay at the centre 
of reforms: the reform of national power sectors, and their subsequent integration into a regional 
grid (Cayo, 2011).  To facilitate this, changes were made to the way in which the IDB supported the 
region’s power sectors with direct support for infrastructure replaced by technical and financial 
support vehicles that would assist the implementation of sectoral reforms, enhancing efficiency, and 
attracting private capital (Rufatt, 2005).  As a result, lending to the public utilities fell dramatically, 
while lending to private investors increased (Cupples, 2011).   
In the five countries that underwent structural reforms, electricity sectors were unbundled and 
experienced a shift from public to private ownership.  Once this took place, a common practice was 
to sell generation plant which was often followed by the sale of shares in distribution companies.  
While the level of competition increased overall, in some instances state monopolies were replaced 
by private monopolies – either by international conglomerates, such as Unión Fenosa in Nicaragua 
and Guatemala and Distribuidora de Electricidad del Sur in El Salvador, or by national elites (Barnes 
and Waddle, 2004; Cupples, 2011).  In Honduras, the reforms to the sector that were enacted in the 
1990s to separate policy, regulation and service, were not fully completed, leaving the utility as a 
vertically integrated state owned enterprise (Flores, 2012).  For Honduras and Nicaragua, 
privatisation of state-owned electricity utilities was a condition of admission to the Heavily Indebted 
Poor Countries Initiative (HIPC) (Cupples, 2011).  Only Costa Rica imposed restrictions on private 
investment in generation and the Instituto Costariccense de Electricidad remains a state-run, 
vertically integrated company (see Meza, 2014 for more detailed description of each country’s 
electricity sectors).  Table 3 outlines the impacts of electricity sector reform on institutional 
arrangements and ownership in the six Central American states. 
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Table 3. Electricity sector reform in Central America: institutional arrangements and shifts in ownership 
Country 
Year of 
reform 
Institutional 
arrangements 
Net private ownership of electricity generation (%) 
1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2014 
CR 1995 Integrated 0 1.6 16.3 13.1 19.8 17.6 
ES 1997 Retail competition 0 6.1 43.7 66.3 64.6 71.0 
GU 1998 
Wholesale 
competition 
0 32.3 58.7 70.0 69.9 74.3 
HO 1994 Integrated 0 31.6 39.5 70.6 62.7 75.3 
NI 2000 
Wholesale 
competition 
0 0.6 55 77.6 80.5 91.0 
PA 1998 
Wholesale 
competition 
3.1 3.8 100 89.3 88.2 85.6 
C. America     0.6 12.4 50.4 68.4 59.8 65.4 
CR = Costa Rica; ES = El Salvador; GU = Guatemala; HO = Honduras; NI = Nicaragua; PA = Panamá.  Sources: 
adapted from CEPAL (2011, 2012, 2015) 
The transition from state-led to market-led governance had a considerable impact on the way in 
which electricity generation, transmission and distribution networks operated.  While it is not the 
aim of this paper to discuss whether these reforms were appropriate to the Central American 
context, it is important to outline some of the key impacts and their contribution to the region’s 
current energy challenges.   
3.1. From hydro to fossil fuel based generation  
Following structural reforms, the region’s electricity generating mix underwent a significant shift 
(see Figure 2).  In particular, we observe a decline in the share of renewable energy generation, 
specifically hydropower (although this has been partially offset by other renewable energy 
generation coming online more recently) – while dependence on imported fossil fuels increased 
(Lecaros et al., 2010; Reinstein et al., 2011; CEPAL, 2011, 2015).  Fossil-based generation presented 
lower risks for private investors than renewable electricity generation due to shorter lead times and 
lower upfront costs.  However, this also locked the Central American economies into higher costs in 
the longer term due to reliance on imported fossil fuels and exposure to international price volatility.  
Between 1990 and 2002, oil use for electricity generation grew annually by an average of 19%.  
While in 1990, Central America’s oil bill amounted to US$ 47 million, by 2002 it had increased to US$ 
444 million (CEPAL, 2003).  Increased reliance on imported fossil fuels had even greater financial 
consequences when international prices rose sharply between 2005 and 2007 (Lecaros et al., 2010).  
Accordingly, Central America has experienced amongst the highest electricity costs in the Western 
Hemisphere (Trinkunas, 2014), although more recent lower oil prices have alleviated this somewhat. 
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Figure 2. Percentage share of net electrical generation by source, 1990- 2014.  
 
Source: adapted from CEPAL (2012, 2015) 
The Central American energy landscape has also been strongly influenced by broader Latin American 
developments. For example since its establishment in 2001, several Central American states2 have 
joined Petrocaribe, a regional oil alliance with Venezuela.  Established by Hugo Chávez to reduce the 
impacts of high oil prices in Central America and the Caribbean, Petrocaribe offers its members 
subsidised oil financing.  Trinkunas (2014) argues that Petrocaribe has led to rising levels of debts 
owed to Venezuela, and had the potential to create disincentives for the adoption of new 
technologies and investment in renewable energy.   
3.2. Electricity access 
The outcomes of the reform process for access to electricity have been uncertain.  As shown in Table 
1, the regional average of electrical coverage improved, reaching 90% of the population by 2014.  
Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua – the three countries with the lowest proportion of electricity 
access in 1990 – have increased electrical coverage from around 40% to between 75-85% in 2010.  
Barnes and Waddle (2004) argue that the historically poor performance of state utilities in rural 
areas meant that private investors were reluctant to invest in projects away from key urban markets.  
As a result, while private investors were effective in connecting consumers in urban and rural areas 
near to the power grid, the needs of those living outside more ‘profitable’ areas of service were 
neglected.  Privatisation did not relieve the state of responsibility for rural electrification, as had 
                                                          
2 Nicaragua joined in 2007, Guatemala and Honduras in 2008, and El Salvador in 2012.  Guatemala left in 2013 
citing changes in financial terms.  Honduras’ membership was suspended in 2009 after the overthrow of the 
Zelaya government, but the country was invited to re-join Petrocaribe in 2014. 
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been expected.  Rather, the provision of electricity to poorer rural areas has come about as a result 
of state intervention (Barnes and Waddle, 2004). However, despite improvements, electrification 
remains limited in rural areas, particularly where demand, population density and incomes are low.   
3.3. Regional electricity integration 
Electricity integration has been another focus of IFI involvement in the region.  During the 1990s, 
frequent supply crises (triggered by high growth in demand), low reserve margins, oil price hikes, 
climatic events (particularly droughts), and delays in the construction of new generation, galvanised 
efforts to create a regional energy market (MER, or Mercado Eléctrico Regional) and regulatory 
system.  At the centre of these efforts has been the development of an interconnected electricity 
grid, SIEPAC.  Potential benefits included enhanced competition, secure electricity supplies where 
generation deficits existed, and greater reliability, efficiency and lower costs due to economies of 
scale (Lecaros et al., 2010).  Incremental progress was made during the 1990s and 2000s, and it was 
not until June 2013 that the 1,800 kilometre electric transmission was completed and the MER 
entered into effect.  While it is expected that SIEPAC will also be connected to Mexico and Colombia 
in the future, political issues, contrasting regulatory regimes, security concerns and local conflicts 
continue to present challenges to the MER and the magnitude of electricity transactions across 
national borders remains relatively low (Martin and Posadas, 2012; Zarnikau et al. 2013; Trinkunas, 
2014).  
4. From the market to an era of intervention? 
The impact of power sector reforms has been variable. Proponents have argued that in most 
countries, their key objectives were achieved, and resulted in more reliable and efficient electricity 
sectors (e.g. Barnes and Waddle, 2004).  However, other more critical voices have stressed that 
reforms have frequently not had the desired outcomes, instead resulting in higher electricity prices, 
a shift from state to private monopolies, widespread consumer opposition, and low distributional 
equity (Herrera-Montoya, 2005; McGuigan, 2007; Cupples, 2011).  The specificities of the relatively 
small Central American markets and the social, economic and political contexts presented significant 
challenges to the reform process, which were arguably overlooked by the national authorities and 
the IFIs implementing them.  Two decades after the process of reforms began, the Central American 
economies are once more faced with a number of energy challenges, some old and some new.  
There is a renewed focus on electricity access, while the confluence of the energy security and 
climate change drivers have led to increased attention being paid to the region’s ample renewable 
energy resources.  But is there evidence for the re-emergence of the state in the electricity sector 
and, if there is, what is driving this governance shift? 
4.1. A re-emergence of the state 
Analysis of regional energy policies published over the last few years provides some evidence for an 
increasingly interventionist model of energy governance in the region.  For example, after 17 years 
of market-led reforms, El Salvador’s 2010 energy policy explicitly acknowledged that sectoral 
reforms weakened the state’s capacity to develop long-term energy strategies.  It observed that as a 
consequence, the ability to plan and think holistically about the energy sector had been lost.  Thus, 
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one of the four objectives of the policy was to re-establish the role of the state in the development 
of the energy sector (CNE, 2010).  Discontent with the privately-led energy model is also evident in 
the Nicaraguan context, manifested in the part-renationalisation of the private electricity 
distribution company Disnorte-Dissur (INE, 2009), and an increased focus on ‘electricity access 
without exclusion’ (NI-MEM, 2011).  Costa Rica (MINAET, 2011) and Guatemala (GU-MEM, 2013) 
most recent energy policies also emphasise the role of the state in meeting normative energy 
objectives.  These policies represent a shift away from the market-led model of the preceding 
decades, one that appears to indicate a resurgence of the state in the energy sector.  
Costa Rica’s recent energy policy states that, owing to the potential for negative environmental 
impacts, there will be no exploration of hydrocarbon reserves.  Rather, the country plans to take 
advantage of its renewable energy potential (MINAET, 2011).  El Salvador is similarly planning to 
expand renewable electricity generation, including large-scale geothermal, hydroelectric and 
concentrated solar power, as well as small-scale wind and solar (CNE, 2010).  Although Guatemala 
also plans to diversify the country’s energy matrix through the exploitation of renewable energy 
sources, as the region’s only oil producer, it also aims to ‘explore and exploit’ national hydrocarbon 
reserves with a view to self-sufficiency (GU-MEM, 2013).  The Nicaraguan government is pushing to 
enact an ambitious overhaul of its energy system, through the transformation of the electricity 
generating mix, in addition to extending grid electricity to rural areas (NI-MEM, 2011).  Honduras, 
which has historically suffered supply deficits, has plans to construct new electricity generation 
capacity, including ambitious investments in solar photovoltaic technologies (PV Magazine, 2015). 
Finally, Panama, historically reliant on hydropower is focusing on significant policies to support wind 
and solar investments (IDB, 2015).  These directions are being solidified and expanded through 
Intended Nationally Determined Contributions (INDCs) - plans submitted by countries regarding their 
post-2020 climate actions under the Paris Agreement3.  Five out of six Central American countries4 
submitted INDCs, outlining planned activities across multiple sectors, including energy, 
transportation, forestry, agriculture, livestock and waste management. 
Energy policies in each of the Central American states are clearly responding to the challenges of the 
energy trilemma, although arguably energy security has been the most influential of these. The 
rising dominance of diesel in the electricity mix over the previous two decades meant that the region 
until recently faced escalating energy bills, in turn affecting economic development, supply security, 
and levels of social conflict.  This was most acute in the case of Nicaragua, which experienced a 
severe energy crisis during 2006-2007 that culminated in rolling blackouts, increased electricity 
prices and contributed to the near collapse of the economy (Cupples, 2011; Gent, 2014).  Across the 
isthmus, reliance on imported oil has therefore dictated that the state take on a more 
interventionist role in energy governance in order to maintain macroeconomic stability and avert 
social and energy crises.   
                                                          
3 For more information on INDCs, see the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change’s INDC 
portal: http://www4.unfccc.int/submissions/INDC/Submission%20Pages/submissions.aspx 
4 Nicaragua declined to submit an INDC. The lead climate envoy argued that Nicaragua could not 
legitimise a ‘failed mechanism’ given that the world remained on track for dangerous climate 
change. See: http://www.climatechangenews.com/2015/11/30/nicaragua-to-defy-un-in-climate-
pledge-refusal/ 
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Whilst oil dependency and associated cost concerns have been a major driver in shifting policies, the 
direction of recent initiatives as well as shifts in the global governance of energy and climate change 
have also been of growing significance. Addressing the energy trilemma has also translated into 
financial opportunities for governments, civil society and the private sector across the region.   
Indeed, the concepts of ‘clean energy’ and ‘energy for all’ currently resonate with the priorities of 
IFIs, and have catalysed the flow of grants and concessional finance to support to address Central 
America’s energy challenges.  For example, the 2015 Climatescope report, which provides data on 
the overall funding landscape for renewable energy in Latin America, identifies significant 
momentum in renewable energy investment in Central America (IDB, 2015).  The report finds that 
between 2009 and 2014, Central America harnessed more than US$ 8.3 billion in clean energy 
investment.  In addition to increased financial flows, governments also recognise the economic 
opportunities offered through the potential sale of electricity to the MER.  For example, the Costa 
Rican energy policy states that the regional electricity market will offer not only the opportunity to 
incorporate the state into a larger market, thus improving its security, but also to sell excess 
generation – principally from renewable sources – to the regional grid (MINAET, 2011).  The 
Guatemalan energy policy also cites opportunities for power exports, both to the MER and, 
eventually, to Mexico (GU-MEM, 2013). 
4.2. Energy paradigms and ‘rule-takers’ 
The preceding discussion suggests that the evolution of Central America’s power sectors broadly 
reflects Goldthau’s paradigm framework (Goldthau, 2012).  In other words, common to other 
regions, energy governance in Central America has gradually shifted from statist to neoliberal to 
increasingly interventionist regimes.  However, this analysis has revealed a number of limitations to 
the energy paradigm framework.  Firstly, the capacity of the Central American states to negotiate 
their energy pathways is conditioned by their relative power in the global political economy.  While 
Goldthau recognises that energy paradigms are linked to ‘rule-setting power’, the key transmitters 
and enforcers of ‘rules’ are not elaborated within the framework.  This points to the need for 
conceptual reworking to improve the applicability of the framework to energy systems within ‘rule 
taking’ contexts.  A second limitation, one intimately tied to their position as ‘rule takers’, is the 
relationship of the Central American states to the major IFIs.  The channelling (or withholding) of 
grants and concessional finance for targeted energy development assistance programmes serves to 
privilege some technologies, policies and market segments over others (see also Smits and Bush, 
2011; Sovacool and Drupady, 2012), impacting on the energy and emission pathways taken.  As key 
vectors of energy policy prescriptions in the isthmus, greater attention needs to be paid to the role 
of IFIs in energy transitions.  Finally, other spheres of influence also require attention in the energy 
paradigm framework.  Section 3.1 drew attention to the role of Venezuelan petrodollars in several 
Central American states; however, declining oil production and the country’s economic crisis leave 
Petrocaribe’s members vulnerable to changes in financial terms and supply reliability (Trinkunas, 
2014).  Other actors have also emerged as important influencers.  For instance, both China and Brazil 
have emerged as important financiers of renewable energy projects in the region.  This echoes 
findings from other studies which conclude that energy assistance is an increasingly important 
feature of South-South cooperation (Johnson and Power, 2012; Baker et al., 2013).  
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5. Conclusions  
Over time, Central American power sectors have responded to global shifts in energy governance.  
Thus, we see a transition from the statist 1970s and 1980s, to the neoliberal paradigm of the late 
1990s, through to the current more interventionist era.  In Central America, this ‘interventionist 
turn’ has coincided with, and been influenced by a shift in global energy policy priorities evidenced 
through recently agreed global frameworks – frameworks likely to set the political conditions, policy 
environments and means to expand access to sustainable energy and stimulate low emission 
development.  The rise to global predominance of the energy trilemma has led to energy policy 
being transformed from being solely seen as an issue of national supply security, to one that 
encompasses global climate change and human development concerns. Central American 
governments have adopted a more prominent role in the delivery of normative energy goals, with 
recent energy policy documents and national plans promoting the uptake of renewable energies and 
highlighting the importance of energy for human and economic development.  The region’s 
renewable energy potential has been noted by IFIs and other global actors, and has already 
attracted considerable investment.  The current policy discourse and the scale of investment 
indicate progressive steps towards addressing Central America’s energy challenges.  However, while 
the climate change and energy poverty policy agendas are important factors at the national and 
regional level – ones that are certainly influencing the financing landscape – the current transition 
has also been heavily influenced by macroeconomic stresses brought about by increased 
dependence on oil, particularly at times of rising international oil prices.  Thus, the extent to which 
an energy transition is underway in the region, one that will lead to a more secure, sustainable and 
equitable energy landscape, remains to be seen.   
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